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Abstract
Few events have the potential to be as destructive for individuals, groups, and 
communities as suicide. By drawing on the theology of Søren Kierkegaard, this 
article aims to elucidate a perspective which contains theo-ethical, psychological, and 
pastoral import for those contemplating, or faced with, the tragic prospect of guilt-
motivated suicide. This is principally done by highlighting the nature and centrality, 
for Kierkegaard, of God’s unconditional and unchanging love in Christ. The pertinent 
offshoots of this for the present article are twofold: firstly, every individual is, at all 
times, held in being by divine love; secondly and correlatingly, the task of every human 
being of conforming his or her will to the selflessness of God cannot be foreclosed—
put differently, perpetual love entails perpetual hope. Despite not usually being 
regarded as a theologian whose work is relevant to public issues, I thus claim that 
Kierkegaard provides resources for a robust position against individual self-execution 
out of guilt.
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Introduction 
Despite its highly affluent and educated backdrop, Søren Kierkegaard’s life was 
not unacquainted with personal tragedy. By the time Kierkegaard was twenty-five, 
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he had lost both his parents, as well as five out of his six siblings.1 At twenty-seven, 
Kierkegaard became engaged to Regine Olsen but soon decided that he had made 
a mistake. In 1841, after thirteen months, Kierkegaard terminated the engagement, 
despite the pleas of his fiancée that he reconsider. Kierkegaard continued to spend 
most of the rest of his life agonising over this decision.2 As anyone will be able to 
appreciate, this period of Kierkegaard’s life affected him deeply, and may go some 
way to explaining the foreboding titles of many of his most famous and widely 
studied works: Fear and Trembling (1843), The Concept of Anxiety (1844), and The 
Sickness Unto Death (1849). Such book titles, when viewed against the backdrop of 
Kierkegaard’s undoubtedly traumatic personal history, have often unkindly earned 
him the Shakespearean description of “melancholy Dane.”3 Although this perception 
remains common, a growing number of scholarly endeavours have sought to expose 
such previous depictions of Kierkegaard as inaccurate. Rather than bearing witness 
to an unhealthy preoccupation with fear, anxiety and sin, it is now argued that 
Kierkegaard’s thought—particularly in his self-authored works—espouses a theology 
of love and hope.4
This article will support such readings of Kierkegaard, by attempting to show 
how his theology has the resources to be pastorally and personally upbuilding 
1 Charles Bellinger, The Trinitarian Self: The Key to the Puzzle of Violence (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 2008), 14.
2 For recent biographies of Kierkegaard, see for instance Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A 
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Stephen Backhouse, Kierkegaard: A 
Single Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016).
3 See for instance Harold Victor Martin, Kierkegaard: The Melancholy Dane (Philosophical 
Library, 1950).
4 A comprehensive but non-exhaustive sample of such scholarship in the last couple of decades 
includes David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works 
of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of 
Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Clare 
Carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2006); Mark A. Tietjen, 
Kierkegaard: A Christian Missionary to Christians (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 
2010). Lee C. Barrett, Kierkegaard (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2010); Anthony Rudd and 
John Davenport, Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015); John Lippitt, “Learning to Hope : The Role of Hope in Fear and Trembling,” in 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Critical Guide, ed. Daniel Conway (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 122–42; Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life, ed. Stephen Minister, J. 
Aaron Simmons, and Michael J Strawser (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2017).
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regarding the concrete religious-ethical issue of suicide. Specifically, I will seek to 
show how Kierkegaard’s understanding of divine love in relation to human beings 
entails that no one should take his or her life because of guilt over what they have 
done or failed to do. The main contour of this argument is that Kierkegaard’s theology 
holds that the selfless love of God revealed in Christ towards individual sinners is 
unconditional and unchangeable. This provides the basis for an enriched account of 
human meaning and value. Regardless of what individuals have done in the past, the 
abiding love of God means that they continue to have relational tasks (opgave) for the 
future. In this way, despite the fact that Kierkegaard’s explicit discussion of suicide 
(described briefly below) does not provide much substantial critique against guilt-
motived suicide, it will be suggested that his theology does have resources for those 
dealing with this most serious of issues. 
Kierkegaardian Self-Denial: “a love-understanding with 
God”
Among the tenets of Kierkegaard’s thought which are often depicted as exuding 
a harsh and puritanical light is his emphasis (in Works of Love) on the individual 
engaging in self-denial (Selvfornegtelse) before others and God. Such an emphasis on 
self-denial, it might be alleged, too easily lends itself to a pathological fixation upon 
feelings of guilt (Skyld). The strength of this allegation is seemingly bolstered by 
Kierkegaard’s endorsement in Works of Love of the Christian’s “hatred” for his own 
life, as well as his conceptually similar recommendation in For Self-Examination that 
individual Christians should spiritually “die” to themselves and “the world.”5 A closer 
examination of Kierkegaard’s writings, however, reveals a negative characterisation 
to be mistaken.
5 Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination; And, Judge for Yourselves; And, Three Discourses 1851, 
trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 97. 
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A fuller appreciation for how Kierkegaard conceives self-denial first requires 
a brief detour to his discussion of self-love and its misapplications in Works of Love.6 
Appropriately enough for the purposes of this paper, this is also one of the few settings 
in which Kierkegaard mentions individual suicide.7 In Works of Love’s “IIA: Thou Shalt 
Love,” Kierkegaard seeks to exemplify the outworking of inappropriate self-love. 
The first case which Kierkegaard mentions is that of “the busy [Travle] man” who 
“wastes his time and energy on vain and unimportant projects” because, Kierkegaard 
suggests, he “has not rightly learned to love himself.”8 The same disordered self-love, 
Kierkegaard argues, lies at the heart of an individual’s determination that he should 
die. He asks:
When the melancholy man wishes to be done with life, aye, with 
himself, is this not because he will not learn strictly and earnestly 
to love himself? . . . when a man presumptuously lays his hand upon 
himself, does not his sin precisely consist in not loving himself in the 
way in which a man ought to love himself?9
The most dangerous “traitor” a person can have, according to Kierkegaard, is himself. 
While other traitors may be capable of inflicting physical harm, spiritual harm can 
result from the individual “selfishly” (selvisk) loving himself in the wrong way.10 As 
6 For an extensive account and critique of Kierkegaard’s conception of self-love, see John 
Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). To further examine the multifaceted issue (which Lippitt examines at length) of whether 
Kierkegaard’s conception of Christian love lies in tension with proper material care for oneself 
and others unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this piece. For a discussion of the implications 
of Kierkegaard’s Christian ethic for one’s attitude towards socio-economic goods generally 
which agrees with Lippitt’s basic assertion that Kierkegaard’s perspective is problematic, see 
G. P. Marcar, “Temporal Goods, Divine Love and the Poverty of Christ: or, How Kierkegaard’s 
Ethic in Works of Love is Economically Apathetic,” Participatio (forthcoming).
7 For a recent overview of suicide in general in Kierkegaard’s works, as well as its relationship to 
despair, see Marius Timmann Mjaaland, “Suicide and Despair,” in Kierkegaard and Death, ed. 
Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 81–100. See 
also Pia Søltoft, “The Transparency of Self-Love? Kierkegaard vs. Frankfurt,” MLN 128, no. 5 
(2013): 118–19.
8 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946), 19–20.
9 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 20.
10 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 20.
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Kierkegaard later writes in “VIII: The Victory of Reconciliation in Love,” “physically 
and externally understood, I can fall by the hand of another, but spiritually there is 
only one that can destroy me, and that is myself.”11 The theological backdrop to 
this claim is that the human self is (as Climacus puts it in SUD) a “synthesis” of the 
temporal and the eternal.12 The attitude of paganism towards suicide, Anti-Climacus 
explains, is a result of its flawed anthropology. “The pagan lacked the spirit’s definition 
of a self, and therefore it judged suicide [Selvmord] . . . [as] neutral . . . since it is no 
one else’s business [Ingen ved, literally ‘no one knows’].”13 Although suicide essentially 
constitutes a “mutinying against God,”14 pagans regard it as a matter of indifference 
because they do not know that the human self is not simply matter, but also spirit/
the eternal. Due to this, the pagan imagination is ignorant of the self ’s normative 
relationship to the eternal/God as “the power that established it.”15
The theological critique of suicide in general which Kierkegaard (or Anti-
Climacus) offers here is noteworthy, but it does not arguably provide much 
psychological or pastoral force. This is perhaps particularly true for those who are 
driven towards taking their own lives out of guilt or self-condemnation.16 Such 
people, one might object, do not regard suicide as a matter of indifference (pace Anti-
Climacus), but are considering this tragic deed precisely because they recognise the 
moral and spiritual gravity of their prior actions as human selves. The remainder of 
this paper will look at the resources which Kierkegaard’s works might provide to 
11 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 269. 
12 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding 
and Awakening, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 13. See also Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 1995), VI B 18 
n.d., 1844–45, (JP 5:5792). http://crkn.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=kierkegaard_j/kierkegaard_j.xml.
13 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, 46. 
14 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, 46.
15 In his Journals, Kierkegaard is more explicit about the “pagans” to whom Anti-Climacus refers; 
he means the stoics. See Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, IX A 373 n.d., 1848 (JP 4:3898); XI1 A 
285 n.d., 1854 (JP 4:3903); X5 A 63 n.d., 1853 (JP 4:4518). 
16 Another group of persons for whom Kierkegaard’s critique might not find much purchase 
are those whose act of self-destruction is a culmination of severe mental illness, for which 
these individuals may lack either full responsibility for, or autonomous control over. Further 
discussion of this type of suicide would require a different paper. 
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address this specific type of suicide, beginning with a re-examination of Kierkegaard’s 
conception of self-denial. 
Kierkegaard’s most extensive treatment of self-denial in Works of Love occurs 
in the last discourse of each of its two series: “V: Our Duty to Remain in the Debt 
of Love to One Another” (first series) and “X: The Work of Love in Recommending 
Love” (second series) respectively. In “X: The Work of Love in Recommending 
Love,” Kierkegaard discusses how self-denial is necessary for a correct relation to the 
eternal/God who (as revealed in the figure of Christ) is selfless love itself. It is “only in 
self-denial” that someone can “completely recommend love; for God is love, and only 
in self-abnegation can a man hold God fast.”17 In self-denial (which belongs to the 
universal), every person has the capacity to become an “instrument of God.”18 Every 
person can come to know everything about love this way, “just as every man can 
get to know that he . . . is loved by God.”19 Kierkegaard comments upon how, while 
some “find this thought more than sufficient for the longest life . . . others . . . find 
this thought so insignificant, since being loved by God is nothing more than is true of 
every man—as if it were therefore less important.”20 An attitude of self-denial is here 
put forward as a necessary corrective for comparison or pride which prevents human 
beings from loving all equally (and being able to endure the worldly consequences 
of this love). Kierkegaard critiques comparison-based attitudes which fail to properly 
appreciate the significance of the God-relationship.
Through disinterestedness, a person becomes capable of being a self-effacing 
“instrument” or “servant” who is “nothing before God” and “does not forget that he 
is before God, wherever he is.”21 Kierkegaard warns of the need to be ever-cautious 
against the danger of encountering others and becoming “proud” of what one can 
do. The person who succumbs to this danger thinks of themself as “something” in 
comparison to others, as a result of which—although they might continue to claim 
that they are “nothing” before God—they have in fact “ensnared” himself in a 
17 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 293.
18 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 293; See also Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, VIII2 B 59:20 n.d., 
1847 (JP 3:3743).
19 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 293.
20 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 293.
21 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 294.
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“delusion.”22 By comparing themselves to others, such individuals demonstrate that 
they have forgotten that they are always before God, behaving instead “as if he (sic) 
was only at certain hours in the presence of God, just as one at a particular hour has 
audience with the royal majesty.”23 In true self-denial, by contrast, Christians entirely 
subjugate their own wills to that of the eternal/God. 
The same dialectic is at play in Kierkegaard’s insistence upon dying to oneself 
in For Self-Examination. To relinquish one’s selfish desires and attachments is what, 
for Kierkegaard, “it means to die” to oneself and the world.24 This is because one’s 
selfish desires are perceived by individuals as co-extensive with their very being, as 
a result of which to give up these desires is more difficult, and causes greater pain, 
than separation from one’s own body.25 Only when someone is completely devoid 
of selfish relationality towards others and God do they “hate himself (sic),” in 
Kierkegaard’s theo-ethical vocabulary.26 In sum then, the entire tenor of Kierkegaard’s 
discussion is radically dependent upon the lens through which someone views it. 
The key determinant, which runs like a thread through Kierkegaard’s account of 
self-love, self-hatred and self-denial, is the need for the Christian lover to relate 
herself undistractedly and unselfishly to the eternal/God.27 As Kierkegaard writes 
elsewhere in his Journals, under this vision self-denial is, in fact, a “relation” which is 
“nothing other than a love-understanding with God.”28 As will become clear in what 
follows, this concept of God’s relation of love to the individual remains central to 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of self-condemnation, forgiveness and hope. 
22 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 294.
23 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 294.
24 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 99.
25 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 97–98. 
26 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 102–103.
27 For a more extensive account of these concepts in Kierkegaard’s works, as well as the 
conceptual link between them, see Sylvia Walsh, “Dying to the World and Self-Denial in 
Kierkegaard’s Religious Thought,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary Volume 21: For Self-
Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
2002), 169–98; see also Sylvia Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian 
Existence (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 2005), 79–112.
28 Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, X4 A 673 n.d., 1852 (JP 6:6824).
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Divine Love: Greater than Human Self-Condemnation 
In Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard dedicates a discourse to 1 John 3:20, “Even if Our 
Hearts Condemn Us, God is Greater than Our Hearts.” In his prayer preceding this 
discourse, Kierkegaard compares God’s action in creating and sustaining the world 
in its existence with his forgiving and reconciling act of love towards humanity in the 
figure of Christ. In Christ, God’s greatness is revealed through His “incomprehensible 
compassion [Forbarmelse].” 29 In his forgiving (tilgive) and having mercy (forbarme) 
towards humanity, God is “greater than the heart that condemns itself.”30 
In saying this, the author of John (as Kierkegaard reads him), does not directly 
compare human greatness with divine greatness, as if God’s greatness were just 
human greatness infinitely inflated. Instead, John ascribes God’s greatness by saying 
that He “is greater than the heart that condemns itself.”31 Kierkegaard relates this 
to the fact that “God and the human being resemble each only inversely.”32 Just as a 
person cannot compare human greatness to God’s greatness by way of a “ladder of 
direct likeness,” so too the human cannot come into a right relation to the eternal/
God “by lifting up his head higher and higher, but inversely by casting himself down 
ever more deeply in worship.”33 The contrast here of height (towards the eternal) with 
depth recalls Kierkegaard’s analogy elsewhere in Works of Love and Purity of Heart is 
to Will One Thing (1847) of how the sea (the human heart) in its depths should mirror 
the sky (the eternal) in its elevation.34 However low human beings are able to go in 
abasing themselves, God will be conversely higher in mercy and love. “[A]s deep as 
this heart can lower itself, and yet never itself deep enough, so infinitely elevated, or 
infinitely more elevated, is God’s greatness in showing mercy [forbarme]!”35 
29 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed. 
and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 289.
30 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 290.
31 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 292.
32 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 292.
33 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 292.
34 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 306; Søren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing: 
Spiritual Preparation for the Office of Confession, ed. and trans. Douglas V. Steere (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1956), 177. 
35 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 292.
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Kierkegaard apophatically continues here by noting that “language seems 
to burst and break in order to describe God’s greatness in showing mercy.”36 The 
human being’s acknowledgement of his relative lowliness displays the correlating 
extent of God’s greatness, which resides in the way in which he “on his own initiative 
(something that did not arise in any human heart) showed mercy [forbarme] upon the 
world.”37 Kierkegaard’s use of the terms forbarme for God’s “mercy” and Forbarmelse 
for God’s (incomprehensible) “compassion” here further underlines this message. As 
with the word translated as mercy in Works of Love (barmhjertighed), both forbarme 
and forbarmelese have an etymological connection to “bosom” (Barm), in which of 
course the heart resides. That God showed such love towards humanity reveals him 
to be greater than the self-condemnations of the human heart (Hjerte), which in turn 
displays precisely the sort of selfless initiative which could not arise from any such 
Hjerte. It is this offensive love that, for Kierkegaard (as for his pseudonymous author of 
Philosophical Fragments, John “of the ladder”), will cause any “ladder of direct likeness” 
between human beings and the God revealed in Christ to fall. For Kierkegaard, this 
revelation of divine outreach also contains the ultimate guarantee that regardless of 
how low human beings sink in the estimations of others or themselves, the abiding 
love of God will always be greater. 
The stark pastoral implications of these claims for someone in danger of 
being suicidally overwhelmed by feelings of self-condemnation and guilt are perhaps 
best introduced with reference to Kierkegaard’s own biblical example. Integral to 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of what it means to say that “even if our hearts condemn 
[fordømmer] us, God is greater than our hearts” (John 3) is the story of the woman 
caught in adultery which appears five chapters later in this gospel (John 7–8). This 
convicted woman, through whom Kierkegaard elsewhere illustrates the efficacy of 
how Christian love can hide a multitude of sins,38 is now employed by Kierkegaard 
to show how the love of God is capable of overcoming even self-condemnation. 
Kierkegaard narrates how after the Pharisees and scribes had left the scene, Christ 
36 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 292.
37 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 294.
38 Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 67–68.
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asks the woman, “has no one condemned [fordømte] you?,” to which she replies 
that no one has.39 According to Kierkegaard, this fact—that there was no one 
who condemned the woman—“can be expressed also in another way: Christ was 
present.”40 Christ remaining with the woman even after her accusers had left, 
“ashamed” because of what Christ had said to them, “signifies in a far deeper sense” 
for Kierkegaard that the love of God revealed in Christ is capable of overcoming any 
condemnatory judgement, including that of someone against themselves.41 
Just as God qua Creator sustains at every moment all that exists, so too God 
qua Saviour of humanity is capable at every moment of overcoming all guilt and self-
condemnation. Indeed, Kierkegaard comments, there remains “only one guilt that 
God cannot forgive—it is to refuse to believe in his greatness!”42 This is not to say 
that God condones, sanctions, or endorses horrendous wrongdoing. According to 
Kierkegaard’s theological ethic, in “hiding” sins, Christian love asserts that human 
beings’ actions do not exhaust who they are; their ontology is not subject to the same 
judgement as their actions.43 Whether said from the pulpit or in private, the derivable 
message from this for someone facing the prospect of guilt-motivated suicide should 
be clear: no one, regardless of what they have done, stands outside the remit of the 
transformative divine love revealed in Christ. 
The Circularity of Love and Forgiveness: Kierkegaard’s Woman Who 
Was a Sinner 
Another (or perhaps the same) scriptural example which Kierkegaard draws upon in 
order to exemplify his theology of divine love and forgiveness is “the woman who 
39 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 289.
40 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 294.
41 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 294.
42 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 294.
43 For further discussion on this point within Kierkegaard’s theological ethics, see Anthony 
Rudd, “‘Believing All Things’: Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt, and Love,” in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary 16: Works of Love, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1999), 121–36; G. P. Marcar, “The Divine Relationship Ethics of Kierkegaard’s Love-Sleuth 
in Works of Love,” Studies in Christian Ethics (2018). https://doi.org/10.1177/0953946818775553.
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was a sinner” of Luke 7:47.44 This Lukan biblical figure is never named, although a 
tradition (of which Kierkegaard was likely aware) exists of her being the same woman 
who is described being caught in adultery in John 7–8. Although Kierkegaard never 
explicitly conflates these characters, he does suggestively place their stories alongside 
one another in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses.45 The most poignant use of this biblical 
character, for the purposes of this paper, can be found in the first of Kierkegaard’s Two 
Discourses at the Communion on Fridays (1851). 
In the figure of “the woman who was a sinner,” Kierkegaard holds that believers 
can learn to recognise their impotence before the love of God in Christ. In her silence 
at Christ’s feet, the woman expressed her conviction that Christ “is capable of 
absolutely everything” while she, conversely, is “capable of literally nothing.”46 The 
woman thereby “loved much” through her self-depreciation. Indeed, Kierkegaard 
describes how one might even say that the woman “hated herself” in her love.47 The 
woman’s weeping expresses a sense of “oblivion” in which she has “entirely forgotten 
herself” before Christ.48 At first sight, Kierkegaard’s emphasis here upon individual 
helplessness and self-erasure might seem counterproductive for seeking to help 
those whose guilt-driven intentions to commit suicide are precisely driven by a sense 
of impotence and desire for personal “oblivion.” The pastoral import of Kierkegaard’s 
account, however, is that the love of God in Christ is entirely unilateral, such that 
even if someone truly believes that they are totally incapable of helping themselves, 
they can nevertheless be reassured of God’s love for them.
44 In Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, X2 A 36 n.d., 1849 (JP 2:1856), Kierkegaard explains that 
the woman who was a sinner (along with the tax collector in Luke 18:9) are “anonymous 
prototypes,” known by their description rather than names.
45 See Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 67–68 (woman caught in adultery in John 
7–8); 75–77 (the woman who was a sinner in Luke 7); see also Lee C. Barrett and Jon Bartley 
Stewart, Kierkegaard and the Bible: The New Testament (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 100, n42. For 
an examination of the woman who was a sinner in Kierkegaard’s thought, see for instance 
Sylvia Walsh, “Prototypes of Piety: The Woman Who Was a Sinner and Mary Magdalene!,” in 
International Kierkegaard Commentary 18: Without Authority, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 2007), 313–43.
46 Søren Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. Sylvia Walsh (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 111.
47 Søren Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 109.
48 Søren Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 111.
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The woman is forgiven because of how much (through her self-denial) she loves. 
The Pharisees discovered the multitude of sins which the woman did not hide; love 
discovered the love which the Pharisees concealed. The logic of loving much, “the 
blessed recurrence of salvation in love,” is thus circular:
First you love much, and much is then forgiven you—oh, and see, love 
then gets even stronger; this, that so much has been forgiven you, it 
loves forth love once again, and you love much because much has been 
forgiven you!49
Love is the strictest standard possible, but it also carries the “consolation” that God’s 
love remains unchanged and continues to abide in the present. Commenting upon the 
present tense of “he loves little” (Luke 7:47), Kierkegaard remarks that “he loves; that 
is to say: this is the way it is now, now at this instant—love does not say more; infinite 
love, that in this way you remain true to yourself even in your slightest utterance! He 
loves little now, at this instant.”50 While other things may change from moment to 
moment, love in a person remains constant, as it comes from God. Whereas “when 
justice judges, it balances the account, closes it; it uses the past tense, saying ‘he loved 
little,’” God’s love—which continually abides—always belongs to the present and 
the future.51 This closely parallels what Kierkegaard elsewhere says in his discourse 
on the “unchangeableness” of God.52 The consolation which accompanies God’s 
unchangeability is that “when you submit yourself to discipline, so that your selfish 
will . . . dies away . . . then you will steadily rest more and more securely, and more 
and more blessedly, in the unchangeableness of God.”53 God is akin to an infinite, 
omnipresent, eternally constant spring which “seeks out the thirsty traveller,” and in 
which rest and peace can therefore always be found.54 In self-deprecatingly weeping 
49 Søren Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 134; For a further examination and 
commentary on this passage, see George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous 
Life: Between Romanticism and Modernism: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 211–17.
50 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 133.
51 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 133.
52 Published in Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 231–40.
53 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 238.
54 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 240.
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herself into “oblivion,” the woman inversely mirrors the self-giving love of God which 
is the only objective, abiding, and universal reality. Just in giving herself away, the 
woman receives the love and forgiveness of God. The “consolation” of God’s love in 
this dynamic, as Kierkegaard puts it, is that God’s love will always exist. There is no 
point at which someone’s self-condemnation can exceed the love which continues to 
uphold and sustain their existence before God. 
The Love of Christ and the Internal Preacher of Conscience 
The second of Kierkegaard’s Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays relates how 
Christ qua God is uniquely able to hide even the sins which are known only to the 
sinner. A person’s conscience, Kierkegaard writes, is akin to a “privy preacher” who 
continuously accompanies a person to all places and at all times.55 As Kierkegaard 
writes, “[a] person can perhaps succeed in hiding his sins from the world . . . but a 
person cannot hide his sins from himself.”56 Conscience, on this conception, resides 
“in the inmost recesses of every human being’s heart” and is akin to an internal 
prosecutor, or perhaps even an in-house executioner. The panacea for this otherwise 
intolerable situation, however, exists: it is the love of God in Christ which “hides” all 
of the human being’s sins. Unlike when human lovers hide a multitude of sins, when 
Christ by his sacrificial love hides a multitude of sins, it removes them (and their 
accompanying guilt) from the sinner’s own subjective consciousness.57 When Christ 
selflessly hides sins in love, their concealment is akin to that which lies “at the bottom 
of the sea,” or in the safety of a mother hen who “gathers her chicks under her wings” 
in order to shield them from danger.58 Although the conscience within the “recesses” 
of the human heart may be self-condemnatory therefore, the love of God is capable of 
hiding its sins as if they did not exist.
55 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 138.
56 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 138.
57 Although Kierkegaard does not elaborate on how this occurs, elsewhere in Works of Love he 
makes an instructive comparison between God’s hiding of sins in love and the creation of the 
world ex nihilo (see Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 240). Just as the world is created by a purely 
gratuitous act of God out of nothing, so too sins which are hidden by God’s love in Christ are 
taken into nothing. In both cases, the self-giving love of God results in an act which ultimately 
transcends the limits of human understanding. 
58 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 140–41.
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Summary
The human mindset of despairing guilt often projects its self-condemnation onto 
the minds and attitudes of others around them, including (in the case of the religious 
believer) that of God himself. Such a projection or false belief is incompatible with 
the message of Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses. Central to the message of the 
Christian gospel, for Kierkegaard, is that God’s becoming like us in Christ also reveals 
the unlikeness of His love. The love of God revealed in Christ is unconditioned, 
unchangeable and without limit, such that it cannot be exhausted by any amount 
of human selfishness or moral failing. As Kierkegaard believes was unambiguously 
demonstrated by both Christ’s interaction with the “woman who was a sinner” (Luke 
7) and Christ’s exoneration of “the woman caught in adultery” (John 7–8), this divine 
love is capable of “hiding” the sins of the guilty person as if they never existed in the 
first place. A person may have committed objectively and non-trivially wrong deeds, 
but this does not mean that the essence of who they are as a human being is also 
irredeemably condemned. With Kierkegaard therefore, the Christian has grounds for 
affirming that any perception of universal condemnation and rejection is not simply 
bad psychology; it is also bad theology. This provides the foundations for a pastoral, 
Kierkegaardian response to someone considering suicide from guilt by theologically 
reframing her past or present circumstances in a new light. A further dimension 
of Kierkegaard’s theology will now be explored which similarly provides a new 
framework in which to see such a person’s earthly future.
Love’s Tasks and the Continuation of Hope 
In his upbuilding discourse entitled, “The Joy of It That in Relation to God a Person 
Always Suffers as Guilty,” Kierkegaard draws on the words of the thief on the cross: 
“We are receiving what our deeds have deserved, but this one has done nothing 
wrong” (Luke 23:41).59 In saying this, the penitent thief recognises that unlike 
59 Søren Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 265; see also Kierkegaard’s 
first upbuilding discourse, “The Upbuilding Thought That Lies in the Thought That in Relation 
to God We Are Always in the Wrong,” in Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part II, ed. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 339–55.
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him, Christ is perfect and innocent. Either God exists and is love universally (“in 
everything”), or he does not exist at all.
[I]f the slightest thing happened that could demonstrate or even merely 
appear to demonstrate that God was not love—well then all would be 
lost, then God would be lost, for if God is not love, and if he is not love 
in everything, then God does not exist at all.60 
For such a demonstration that God was (or is) not love, two conditions must be met: 
firstly, one must be completely innocent and without guilt before God, “because only 
on this assumption can doubt gain a foothold”; secondly, something must happen 
which might be incompatible with God being love.61 These conditions could have 
only been met by the person of Christ, as he was entirely without fault in his human 
nature (the first condition) and yet suffered execution at the hands of others on the 
cross (thereby fulfilling the second condition).62 The aspect which mitigates against 
this being a sound demonstration that God is not love is, of course, the belief that 
Christ was God. As all other human beings are not without guilt,63 no proof of God 
not being love exists.  
The upbuilding offshoot of this message is that, as one cannot claim to be 
absolutely in the right in relation to God, improvement always remains possible. If, 
conversely, God was in the wrong (and therefore not love), then no improvement 
would be possible, and there would be no certainty of further tasks [opgave]. “The 
tasks of faith and hope [Haab] and love and patience and humility and obedience—
in short, all the human tasks, are based on the eternal certainty that God is love.”64 
This situation, in which the individual continues to exert his will but does not have 
any tasks, is true hopelessness for Kierkegaard. To illustrate this point, Kierkegaard 
60 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 267.
61 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 270.
62 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 270.
63 Kierkegaard later notes that this includes even the biblical figure of Job. This is despite the fact 
that this individual (Kierkegaard elsewhere writes) was as a “teacher” and “guide” to humanity 
because of the way in which, even during times of great suffering, he orientated his will towards 
God as a grateful recipient towards an unambiguous giver. See Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses, 112–22.
64 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 277.
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contrasts the situation of someone “sunk in a bog,” with a person who struggles at sea 
against the danger of drowning. Although both these individuals face the prospect of 
death, only the former sunken one is hopeless, because unlike the person struggling 
against the elements to survive, the sunken one is totally subdued and without a task.65 
From the heart of God—the inexhaustible source of all love—issues “the life in the 
tasks.”66 Without a conception of God as eternally loving, there can be no tasks and, 
therefore, no hope. Kierkegaard alludes here (perhaps) to the figure of Socrates, who 
committed suicide by electing to be put to death through the ingestion of hemlock: 
Even the wisest pagan who has ever lived . . . still has . . . a gloominess in 
his inner being, because when all is said and done the pagan could never 
be eternally sure and clear whether the fault lay with him or whether 
it might in a rare case lie with God . . . by leaving him without a task. 
One can excuse the pagan only by saying that this is so because his god 
himself is gloomy.67 
Kierkegaard here seems to interpret Socrates’ demeanour (along perhaps with the 
resultant manner of his death) as the inevitable outcome of his pagan theology. 
Without the belief that God is actively and ceaselessly loving, a suicidal disposition 
of hopelessness—metaphorically represented by Kierkegaard’s example of the 
individual “sunk in a bog”—is arguably inevitable. When the existence of such a God 
is affirmed to those with suicidal inclinations, however, this carries the potential to 
radically and paradigmatically change their perspective. 
This potential can be seen in Kierkegaard’s account, where next he returns to 
the robber crucified next to Christ in Luke 23. At first sight, it might seem as if because 
he is moments away from death, “there can be no occasion for tasks” for the robber.68 
However, Kierkegaard argues, because the robber acknowledges that in relation to 
God he suffers as guilty (and that, correlatingly, God is love), he still has a “final task”: 
65 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 276.
66 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 277.
67 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 278.
68 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 280.
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“repent and regret.”69 Orientated in this manner towards God, “the repentant robber 
humbly understands” that, even in the midst of his desperate situation, “it is not 
God who has abandoned him but it is he who has abandoned God.”70 Kierkegaard 
comments that if, at the last moment, the penitent robber had been granted a reprieve 
from his sentence of death, he would have accepted this reprieve with the “comfort” 
that there were now “plenty of tasks” for him to do.71 The belief that God is love, the 
existence of tasks, the presence of hope and the feeling of comfort are all inextricably 
linked. “[I]f there is a task, there is hope, and that there is a task and hope is the 
comfort.”72 Within the Roman Catholic tradition, the penitent thief of Luke 23 has 
long been known as “Saint Dismas,” with patronage over all condemned prisoners. 
Although far from this tradition in many respects, the figure of this penitent thief in 
Kierkegaard’s thought may likewise be said to provide an example par excellence of 
how not only condemned prisoners, but also those who out of suicidal remorse and 
guilt have condemned themselves, can still have a relationship of love to God in Christ. 
Love as the “source of all tasks [opgave]” in Works of Love
In “V: Our Duty to Remain in the Debt of Love to One Another,” Kierkegaard 
describes how, despite “remaining in the debt of love” appearing to be an intrinsically 
passive phrase, to pursue this task of Christian love is to be in such a state of perpetual 
action, akin to an arrow in mid-flight.73 In this state, Christians can never know 
whether they have “achieved the highest” (or for that matter, the lowest), as there 
is no point in which they would have the requisite time without a task to assess 
this question. As “there would at that very moment, from the Christian standpoint, 
be a new task [opgave] . . . it is impossible to have time to know whether one has 
achieved the highest or not; for at the moment when one would get to know it, he 
is engaged in accomplishing the new task.”74 While busyness, comparison, and 
self-distractedness impede Christian love’s perpetual movement by turning the 
69 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 280.
70 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 280.
71 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 281.
72 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 281.
73 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 147–48; see also, 108.
74 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 152.
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focus back towards oneself (akin to the aforementioned arrow turning to itself and 
therefore discontinuing its flight), self-denial maintains the individual’s relationality 
to the eternal/God, resulting in a continuous outwards movement towards a new 
“task” of self-giving love. 
The Christian imperative to love one’s neighbour, the “shalt” of the 
commandment in Matthew 22, means that the Christian’s duty to love is the “the 
moral task” which is “the source of all tasks [opgave].”75 Speaking of how “love is 
the fulfilment of the law,” Kierkegaard emphasises how love does not seek to waste 
a moment but is “immediately in line with the task.”76 This is captured by Christ’s 
answer, in the form of the parable of the Good Samaritan, to the person who asks him 
“who is my neighbour?” In answering his questioner through this story, Kierkegaard 
writes that Christ “took the questioner captive in the answer which included the 
task.”77 Here, as in his earlier discourse “The Joy of It That in Relation to God a 
Person Always Suffers as Guilty,” Kierkegaard connects the existence of tasks (whose 
source is the duty to love) to the presence of hope.78 Indeed, Kierkegaard describes in 
“III: Love Hopeth All Things” how hoping for others and oneself is a relation of “like 
for like.”79 If one loves the eternal/God, then one will have an attitude of expectancy 
towards the good in all others, including oneself. One cannot have an expectancy 
towards the good (hope) in oneself if the eternal/God does not exist. If, however, God 
does exist, then the Christian who is orientated towards the eternal will be hopeful to 
his “last day,” as it is the “duty and task” of love to ensure hope continually.80
Conclusion 
That God is perfectly loving—as Kierkegaard perceives the penitent thief being 
crucified next to Christ as acknowledging in his statement that Christ “has done 
nothing wrong”—leads to the realisation that there is hope. The selflessness of the 
eternal/God exceeds all limitations imposed by the human self, including those of its 
75 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 42.
76 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 78.
77 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 79.
78 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 204.
79 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 206.
80 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 209.
58 Colloquium 51/1 2019
own condemnation. However deep the self descends into itself, the love of the eternal 
which sustains and perpetuates it in being will always be correspondingly higher, as it 
continues at every moment to maintain the self, and all other things, in being.81 With 
the abidingness of God’s love comes the inexhaustibility of the imperative to love, 
and the correspondingly continuous nature of the tasks (opgave) which flow from 
this source. 
As Kierkegaard concludes in his upbuilding discourse, the thought that in 
relation to God one always suffers as guilty is “a man’s will in covenant with God; 
it is the will of one who before God . . . is also in covenant with the victory.”82 Even 
the penitent thief, or the woman who “was a sinner” and capable of doing “literally 
nothing” herself, is thus enabled to fulfil Christianity’s imperative to “love the Lord 
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind . . . And . . . 
your neighbour as yourself” (Matthew 22:37–39; Luke 10:27). The constant possibility 
of being co-participants in God’s transcendent outreach of love towards humanity 
entails that no human being should ever consider themselves to have spent, through 
his own actions, the ethical-religious value of staying alive. 
Although necessarily only a prolegomenon on this issue, I hope in this limited 
space to have demonstrated that Kierkegaard’s ethical thought possesses the 
psycho-pastoral resources for a religious and ethical response to the prospect of 
guilt-motivated suicide. Regardless of how existentially inadequate or undeserving 
of life a person might feel, the theology which Kierkegaard espouses affirms that 
he or she continues to be loved by God in Christ. The life of every human self is 
indelibly validated by the selfless and eternal love which is its sustainer and source 
(or as Anti-Climacus puts it, “the power that established it”). The realisation of this 
81 C.f. Julian of Norwich in her Revelations of Divine Love, where she makes a strikingly similar 
connection between God’s abiding love, and the ontological persistance of human beings qua 
creatures: “For I saw full surely that where our Lord appeareth, peace is taken and wrath hath 
no place. For I saw no manner of wrath in God, neither for short time nor for long;—for in 
sooth, as to my sight, if God might be wroth for an instant, we should never have life nor place 
nor being . . . For though we feel in ourselves, [frail] wretches, debates and strifes, yet are we 
all-mannerful enclosed in the mildness of God and in His meekness, in His benignity and in 
His graciousness. For I saw full surely that all our endless friendship, our place, our life and our 
being, is in God.” Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, 2002), 102.
82 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 288.
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truth also grounds Kierkegaard’s theology of hope, which offers the guarantee to 
every individual that regardless of their past or present circumstances, the task of 
conforming their will in self-denying love to that of the eternal/God remains open for 
them to do.
